Martin on Social Security

Part 2 – Topics

General Legal Issues

§ F 100. Constitutional Law and Social Security – Other Issues: e.g., Equal Protection, Substantive Due Process, Taking

Numerous amendments to the Act having adverse impacts on particular categories of beneficiaries or covered workers have been attacked on the ground that they constitute a taking of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment.  All such arguments have failed with the Supreme Court.

In Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed To Social Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986), the Court upheld an amendment to the Act that barred termination of agreements for coverage of state employees including terminations for which notice had already been filed.

In Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971), the Supreme Court upheld enactment of a worker’s compensation offset provision against an attack based on the 5th Amendment.

In Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), the Supreme Court upheld an amendment of the Act terminating benefits to aliens deported because of Communist Party membership.  It held that Congress can amend the Act in ways reducing or terminating benefits without those changes constituting a deprivation of accrued property rights that would violate the 5th Amendment.

With the exception of gender distinctions and different treatment of children born outside of marriage, nearly all categories that lead to different benefit treatment have also been upheld against attack under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

In Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340 (1986), the Supreme Court upheld the Act’s differential treatment of remarriage by widows and surviving divorced wives.

In Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979), the Court upheld the restriction of “mothers” benefits to women who had been married to the insured worker even though that denied benefits to the mothers of children born outside marriage.  The Court viewed the different treatment in terms of the respective classes of mothers and not their children.

In Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977), the Court upheld the Act’s provision terminating benefits to a disabled child upon marriage to a person who is not entitled to Social Security benefits (while continuing benefits to those who marry individuals receiving benefits).

In Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld the provisions of the Act that extend spouse benefits to younger spouses of retired or disabled workers who are caring for children also eligible for benefits but deny comparable benefits to younger divorced spouses.  The differential treatment had been attacked as a violation of the equal protection component of the Due Process clause of the 5th Amendment.

In Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld the Act’s provisions dealing with proof of dependency by children born outside marriage.  The decision, which provides important interpretation of those provisions, concludes that requiring proof of financial dependency of those children who cannot establish a purported marriage or written acknowledgment of parenthood or a court order does not violate the equal protection component of the Due Process clause of the 5th Amendment.

In Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), the Supreme Court upheld the 9 month duration of relationship requirement the Act applies to surviving spouses.  The Court found the resulting categories free from invidious discrimination and rationally based, using an objective test to prevent the use of sham marriages to get benefits.

In Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974), the Supreme Court struck down the provisions of the Act which then denied benefits to children born outside marriage whose dependency on a disabled worker did not arise until after the onset of disability.  It found the differential treatment of non-marital children to be in violation of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment.

[Supporting and Elaborating References] [Related Sections: Part 1 - Part 2]

§ F 110. Constitutional Law and Social Security – Gender Distinctions

Before the Federal courts began to strike these distinctions down the family benefit provisions of the Act contained numerous gender differences.

In Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), the Supreme Court found the Act’s distinction between widows and widowers to be unconstitutional.

However, in Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984),  the Supreme Court upheld a transition provision resurrecting a gender-based difference.  In effect the challenged provision shielded women more generously than men from a new pension offset for spouse benefits during a five year grace period.  The aim, which the Court found acceptable, was protection of the expectations of those who, prior to Califano v. Goldfarb and the subsequent enactment of a pension offset, would have been eligible to receive spouse benefits.

And in Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977), the Court upheld the Act’s provision (since removed by Congress) allowing women to subtract a larger number of low income years from the base upon which their primary insurance amount was calculated.  The Court saw this as an effort to remedy some of the effects of past discrimination.

In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), the Supreme Court held that the provisions of the Act which then extended benefits to younger widows caring for eligible children but not younger widowers violated the equal protection component of the Due Process clause of the 5th Amendment.  The Court characterized the differential benefits as discrimination against the deceased female workers whose earnings secured their families a smaller package of benefits than comparable male workers.

[Supporting and Elaborating References] [Related Sections: Part 1 - Part 2]

§ F 120. Constitutional Law and Social Security – Procedural Due Process

In Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979), the Supreme Court held that procedural due process required a prerecoupment oral hearing to determine “fault” and whether recoupment was “equitable” in the case of those seeking waiver of recoupment on these grounds.  In the same case, the Court held that due process does not require a hearing when a claimant requests reconsideration of an Agency decision.

In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Supreme Court held that due process does not require a full hearing prior to termination of Social Security disability benefits.  Reviewing the pre-termination procedures, the Court found that they complied with due process requirements.

In Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971), the Supreme Court held that written reports by physicians who had examined a disability claimant constituted substantial evidence supporting a finding that the claimant was not disabled, notwithstanding the absence of cross-examination and the existence of opposing testimony by the claimant and claimant’s medical witness.  The Court found the hearing procedure followed in disability cases to be consistent with the requirements of procedural due process.

While in many legal contexts notice meets “due process” requirements so long as it is reasonably calculated to reach and inform the person entitled to be notified, several circuits have ruled that a notice of time limits for administrative appeal sent to a disability claimant too mentally ill to understand it is constitutionally defective.

Rev. 3/98

[Supporting and Elaborating References] [Related Sections: Part 1 - Part 2]

§ F 200. General Issues of Statutory Interpretation

When issues of interpretation arise over particular provisions of the Act standard approaches to statutory interpretation apply.

Significantly, these include judicial deference to the interpretation of the Agency, which is charged with administering the Act.  As the approach is often described, if the Act has spoken precisely on the issue that ends the matter.  If it has not then the Agency’s interpretation is followed so long as it is consistent with the provisions of the Act.  On the other hand, if the Agency interpretation is contrary to the intent of Congress reflected in the Act and its legislative history, it will not prevail.

[Supporting and Elaborating References] [Related Sections: Part 1 - Part 2]

§ F 300. General Issues of Interpretation or Validity of a Regulation

The Act specifically authorizes the Agency to promulgate rules and regulations not inconsistent with its provisions.  In addition, detailed provisions on a variety of points are explicitly left by the Act to Agency regulations.  While very few regulations have ultimately been struck down for inconsistency with the Act, some have.  And many more have been interpreted by courts in ways designed to preserve their validity.

Judicial review of a regulation is limited to determining whether its provisions exceed statutory authority or are arbitrary and capricious. Moreover, courts defer to the Agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.  Courts accept the Agency’s  interpretation if it is reasonable in terms of the words of the regulations and the purposes of the Act, even though, as an original matter, the court might have reached a different conclusion.

[Supporting and Elaborating References] [Related Sections: Part 1 - Part 2]

§ F 400. Effect of a New or Amended Statutory Provision on Current Claims

The standard approach to interpreting amendments to the Act is to view them as addressing the future and not the past.  Unless the amendments are understood as simply codifying or clarifying prior law, they are not, under this view, interpreted as applying to individuals whose claims have already been determined.  The more difficult questions concern individuals whose claims are in various stages of review or appeal.  Particular language of the amendment may offer guidance on this point, but more general references to entitlement or determination have given difficulty.  Like all questions of interpretation the question of how an amendment affects existing claims in various stages of adjudication is one on which the Agency’s interpretation is likely to prevail if the amendment itself is unclear and the retroactivity issue is one on which its expertise is seen as having a bearing.

[Supporting and Elaborating References] [Related Sections: Part 1 - Part 2]

§ F 500. Effect of a New or Amended Regulation on Current Claims

Changes in regulations that, in the Agency’s view, merely provide clarification or codification of prior law raise few retroactivity issues when they are applied favorably to claims in the appeals process.  When, however, they are seen by the claimant as having an adverse effect and as changing the law, the issue of retroactive application arises.  It also arises when an administrative law judge decision rendered after the effective date of the new regulation fails to refer to its provisions.

Courts have occasionally put forth the general proposition that new regulations should only be applied retroactively to the extent that they either produce no change or benefit the claimant.

Sometimes the Agency will seek remand of a case by a district court to allow application of a new regulation.  In such a case, the regulation may well constitute good cause for the remand, but courts have resisted any suggestion that such remands should be automatic.

[Supporting and Elaborating References] [Related Sections: Part 1 - Part 2]

§ F 600. Legal Effect of Social Security Rulings

Social Security Rulings, now issued in the Federal Register, are, according to the Agency, binding on all its components. Courts have held that a failure to follow a ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion.

The rulings are not treated by courts as regulations.  Nonetheless, they are viewed as official Agency interpretations of the Act due appropriate deference when an issue of statutory interpretation is before a court.

In addition to ordinary rulings, the Agency now issues a distinct class it terms Social Security Acquiescence Rulings.  These acknowledge and interpret judicial opinions that take a position contrary to the Agency’s and direct Agency staff within the relevant U.S. Court of Appeals circuit to adhere to the judicial authority.  These rulings apply to all levels of Agency adjudication.  Social Security Ruling SSR No. 96-1p provides that unless and until an Acquiescence Ruling has been issued, judicial decisions conflicting with the Agency’s interpretation of the Act or regulations shall not be followed in the adjudication of other claims.  It also notes that decisions of Federal district courts will not result in such rulings.

Rev. 9/96

[Supporting and Elaborating References] [Related Sections: Part 1 - Part 2]

§ F 700. Legal Effect of the POMS

The Programs Operations Manual System (POMS), previously named the Claims Manual, is a many volume set of directives and interpretations issued by the Agency for internal staff use.

In Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981), the Supreme Court held that the manual had no legal force and did not bind the Agency.

While its provisions on a specific point of interpretation may not bind the Agency, courts do on occasion refer to the POMS as a means of determining Agency interpretation or practice.

Rev. 12/96

[Supporting and Elaborating References] [Related Sections: Part 1 - Part 2]