Burgess v. United States

Statutory Background

Section 802(13) of the Act defines the term "felony" as an offense classified by applicable law as a felony. Prior to 1994, section 841(b)(1)(A) of the Act ("enhancement provision") defined a similar term, "felony drug offense," as an offense concerning narcotic drugs, marijuana, depressants, or stimulants that is classified by applicable law as a felony. In 1994, Congress amended the CSA ("Conforming Amendments") to conform to a newly enacted criminal statute, the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act. The Conforming Amendments redefined the term "felony drug offense" to constitute a drug-related offense punishable by more than one year's imprisonment, regardless of state-law designation. The enhancement provision currently mandates a minimum 20-year sentence for any violator of section 841(a) with a prior conviction for a "felony drug offense."

In 2003, a federal district court convicted Keith Burgess of intent to distribute fifty or more grams of cocaine base, in violation of � 841(a)(1). The court ruled that though Burgess' prior drug conviction was a misdemeanor under state law, because it was punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, it fell under the � 802(44) definition of "felony drug offense." Therefore, pursuant to the enhancement provision, the court increased Burgess' sentence to twenty years. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the definition of "felony drug offense" displaces the definition of "felony."

Issue #1: Statutory Interpretation

Burgess argues that both the definitions of "felony" and "felony drug offense," combined, define the term "felony drug offense," as opposed to just the definition of "felony drug offense." Under Burgess' preferred reading, a "felony drug offense" must be both punishable by more than one year of imprisonment and classified by applicable law as a "felony." The lower courts, however, adopted the First Circuit's holding in United States v. Roberson, 459 F.3d 39, 55 (1st Cir. 2006), that the definition of "felony drug offense" unambiguously controls-if state law punishes an offense by a sentence of greater than one year, state-law classification as felony or misdemeanor is irrelevant.

Term of Art?

The United States' position is that "felony drug offense" is a term of art and is distinct from the term "felony." That is, because the CSA specifically defines "felony drug offense" and the enhancement provision uses that exact term, the logical way to interpret that term in the enhancement provision is to use only the definition of "felony drug offense." The Roberson court agreed, stating "[w]hen a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term's ordinary meaning." In United States v. West, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuitdisagreed, reasoning that because Congress defined the term "felony" in the same section as the term "felony drug offense," the two definitions are coequal. Consequently, Congress' intent was not to treat "felony drug offense" as a term of art unaffected by other definitions in the same section.

Intended Only to Conform?

Burgess urges the Court to interpret the term "felony drug offense" according to legislative intent. In determining the Congress' intent when the plain meaning of a statute's text is in question, courts consider the statute's legislative history, structure, and motivating policies. Specifically, the title of a statute section is one item to consider in resolving ambiguity. According to Burgess, there was no explanation for the Conforming Amendments in the legislative history or the statute itself. Burgess argues that the presence of the term "conforming" in the Amendments' title implies that Congress merely intended to conform the CSA to parallel provisions in the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, not to make a substantive change.

The United States disagrees, noting that the intent to make conforming changes does not preclude an additional intent to make a substantive change. It argues that because Congress replaced the entire definition of the term, it must not have intended to preserve the old meaning. Further, the United States claims, the CSA uses the term "felony drug offense" only in the context of the enhancement provision, while it uses the term "felony" for multiple purposes throughout Title 21. Thus, Congress intended that the post-1994 definition of "felony drug offense" apply to the enhancement provision exclusive of the term "felony." Burgess asserts that there is no evidence that Congress desired to make a sweeping change that would render the definition of the term "felony" partially ineffective. � Burgess notes that "[r]epeals by implication are not favored and will not be found unless an intent to repeal is 'clear and manifest.'"

Omission of Cross-Reference Implies Intent?

The United States argues that if Congress had intended the term "felony drug offense" to be defined by reference to the term "felony," it could have indicated that objective by including an explicit cross-reference in the text of section 802(44), as has been done in other provisions of the U.S. Code. Burgess responds that Congress could have as easily amended the CSA to specify that � 802(44) was the exclusive means to define the term "felony drug offense" for the purposes of � 841(b)'s sentence enhancement.

Issue #2: Ambiguity and Lenity

Burgess finally argues that the rule of lenity should apply. Under the rule of lenity, "an ambiguous criminal statute is to be construed in favor of the accused." If the text, structure, legislative history, and motivating policies of the statute create "grievous" ambiguity regarding the scope of the statute's application, the rule of lenity applies. The rule of lenity applies to sentencing as well as substantive statutes.

The D.C. Circuit in West held that the term "felony drug offense" in the enhancement provision is ambiguous, and therefore lenity applies. Burgess agrees, arguing that even if the term is not meant to be interpreted as a combination of the definitions of � 802(13) and � 802(44), at best, it is ambiguous. The United States responds that lenity does not apply because there is no "grievous" ambiguity about the scope of the statute.