Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

The Court must determine how the PDA requires employers to accommodate pregnant workers. The PDA is included in Title VII, which prohibits employers from discriminating based on sex. The Court’s analysis will deal with the following two issues: (1) what a proper reading of the PDA is in terms of accommodating pregnant employees; and (2) whether UPS’s actions constitute pregnancy discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis.

Young contends that a proper reading of the PDA requires an employer to provide pregnant employees with the same accommodations that non-pregnant employees receive when they are disabled or injured on-the-job. In opposition, however, UPS argues that the PDA mandates no such accommodations. Additionally, UPS maintains that under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, they did not discriminate against pregnant employees. Nevertheless, Young argues that even under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis UPS’s actions constitute pregnancy discrimination.

DETERMINING THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF THE PDA

Young contends that the PDA requires an employer to provide pregnant employees with the same accommodations that non-pregnant employees receive when non-pregnant employees are disabled or injured on-the-job. Young argues that the PDA’s plain text states that, if an employer accommodates non-pregnant workers who cannot fulfill the standard requirements of their job, then that employer must also accommodate pregnant workers whose ability to perform their job is similarly limited. According to Young, the statute does not differentiate between workplace limitations caused by injuries and those caused by pregnancy. Young further contends that this interpretation is consistent with the PDA’s legislative history. Young emphasizes that Congress enacted the PDA in order to nullify the decision in General Electric v. Gilbert where the Supreme Court held that an insurance plan, which did not accommodate an employee’s a pregnancy-based disability, was not discriminatory because the disability was an “additional risk” that was “unique to women.”

Under her interpretation of the PDA, Young argues that UPS violated the PDA by treating a pregnant employee worse than non-pregnant employees with conditions that prevent them from fulfilling their usual job requirements. Young explains that UPS accommodated three groups of non-pregnant truck drivers, including “those who experienced injuries on the job; those whose conditions qualify as disabilities under the ADA; and those whose conditions render them ineligible for DOT certification.” Young also points out that UPS accommodated drivers, who had the exact same heavy-lifting limitation as Young, by granting these employees light-duty work. Young argues that her limited ability to work was the only reason UPS denied her the opportunity to do similar light-duty work.

In opposition, UPS contends that the PDA does not require an employer to provide pregnant employees with the same accommodations that non-pregnant employees receive when they are disabled or injured on-the-job. UPS asserts that the PDA must be “read as a whole.” UPS contends that, under this “plain reading of the text,” the PDA’s only function is to confirm that Title VII’s “principles of equal treatment” covers pregnant employees. UPS argues that the PDA was not intended to give pregnant women special status but rather to ensure that they were treated equally. UPS adds that reports, which were drafted by the House of Representatives and the Senate, explain that the PDA was not meant to “[effect] changes in practice . . . beyond those intended by Title VII.” UPS also explains that various Senators stated the PDA does not require employers to give pregnant employees “special treatment” by providing pregnant employees the accommodations that employees receive only when they were injured on-the-job or have an ADA-qualified disability.

Under its interpretation of the PDA, UPS argues that it did not violate the PDA by refusing to give a pregnant employee such “special treatment.” UPS explains that Title VII, which the PDA falls under, states that pregnant women should receive “equal treatment” to other “similarly situated employees.” UPS argues that adopting Young’s interpretation of the PDA will require adding “something more” to Title VII. Furthermore, UPS adds that the PDA technically “proscribes no conduct” because the PDA is located under the Title VII’s “Definitions” section. UPS reasons that Congress would not have included the PDA under the Definitions section if Congress intended for the PDA to substantially reform discrimination laws.

ANALYZING UPS’S POLICY UNDER THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS FRAMEWORK

The test established in McDonnell Douglas Corp allows a plaintiff-employee to allege employer discrimination when “direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by.” Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, an employee must first show “by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.” If the plaintiff fulfills this burden, the employer must then show a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for taking the actions in question.

UPS contends that its actions do not constitute pregnancy discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. UPS argues that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis applies in this case because Young has “no direct evidence” to show that UPS’s accommodations policy was motivated by the intent to discriminate against pregnant women. UPS further contends that, under the McDonnell Douglas test, Young cannot prove that UPS acted with the intent to discriminate against pregnant employees. UPS contends that Young cannot compare herself to the light-duty eligible employees because these employees normally only required “short-term temporary assignments [that] rarely lasted longer than 30 days.” UPS argues that Young can only be compared to other employees whose conditions or injuries arose off-the-job, such as “the arthritis sufferer and the overzealous gardener.” UPS concludes that, since it does not traditionally accommodate these employees, Young cannot show that UPS “single[d] out pregnant” employees in a discriminatory fashion.

Young, however, argues that since the discriminatory intent behind UPS’s accommodations policy is so evident, there is no need to apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. Furthermore, Young maintains that UPS’s actions constitute pregnancy discrimination even under the McDonnell Douglas test. Young contends that even if the Court applies the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, she should prevail because UPS accommodated employees that had workplace limitations that were similar to that of a pregnant employee. Young explains that UPS’s violation of the PDA is clear because UPS’s accommodation policies explicitly assist certain medical conditions, and those medical conditions do not include pregnancy.