| Concurrence [ Stevens ] | Dissent [ White ] |
|---|---|
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No.
MONTANA, PETITIONER v. DONALD GLENN IMLAY
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of montana
[
Justice
As an initial matter, there can be no doubt that the decision below is a "final judgment" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Although the Montana Supreme Court remanded the case for resentencing, this is clearly a case in which "the federal issue, finally decided by the highest court in the State, will survive and require decisionregardless of the outcome of future state court proceedings." Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 480 (1975); see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 85, n. 1 (1963).
At oral argument, however, two further questions were raised concerning whether any live controversy persists in this case. First, counsel for respondent stated that his client had been assured by state corrections officials that he would be paroled in the very near future. If this were true, the outcome of this case could have no practical effect upon respondent's sentence. Second, counsel for petitioner stated his belief that a probationer would enjoy immunity from prosecution for incriminating statements made during court ordered therapy. This statement calls into doubt a critical assumption underpinning the Montana Supreme Court's judgment and might suggest that there really is no disagreement about the Fifth Amendment's application to this case.
In my view, however, neither party's representation is sufficient to deprive this case of its status as a case or controversy. First, as counsel for both parties readily acknowledged, there is nothing in the record to support the expectation of respondent's counsel that respondent will be paroled shortly without regard to his completion of the State's therapy program. As far as the record is concerned, a decision in this case would affect respondent's eligibility for parole and thus have real consequences for the litigants.
Nor does the State's "concession" that a defendant would have immunity from prosecution based upon incriminating statements made to a therapist moot this case or otherwise render it unsuitable for review. This "concession" appeared to rest solely on the State's assumption that this Court's decision in Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984), mandated such a result. That reading of Murphy, however, is at least debatable. Because the State's concession appears to reflect a possible misunderstandingof its obligations under the law rather than any unequivocal and unconditional declaration of its own future prosecutorial policy, this statement does not moot this case or obviate the controversy. If its reading of Murphy were shown to be erroneous, the State might well revert to the view that a defendant could be prosecuted on the basis of statements made during postconviction therapy. Such a qualified concession is too uncertain a basis to find that no live controversy is presented. Cf. United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453, 456, n. 6 (1983); United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., Inc., 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968). In any event, the Montana Supreme Court evidently was of the view that no grant of immunity protected respondent or others in his position and the State continues to suffer the consequences of its constitutional holding.
Because I believe that a genuine and important controversy is presented in this case, I respectfully dissent from the dismissal of the writ of certiorari.