| Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
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103 F.Supp. 569, affirmed. |
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| Syllabus
| Opinion
[ Black ] | Opinion
[ Frankfurter ] | Concurrence
[ Frankfurter ] | Concurrence
[ Douglas ] | Concurrence
[ Jackson ] | Concurrence
[ Burton ] | Concurrence
[ Clark ] | Dissent
[ Vinson ] |
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Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER.
Although the considerations relevant to the legal enforcement of the principle of separation of powers seem to me more complicated and flexible than may appear from what MR. JUSTICE BLACK has written, I join his opinion because I thoroughly agree with the application of the principle to the circumstances of this case. Even though such differences in attitude toward this principle may be merely differences in emphasis and nuance, they can hardly be reflected by a single opinion for the Court. Individual expression of views in reaching a common result is therefore important.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT
EXECUTIVE ORDERDirecting the Secretary of Commerce to Take Possession of andOperate the Plants and Facilities of Certain Steel CompaniesWHEREAS, on December 16, 1950, I proclaimed the existence of a national emergency which requires that the military, naval, air, and civilian defenses of this country be strengthened as speedily as possible to the end that we may be able to repel any and all threats against our national [p590] security and to fulfill our responsibilities in the efforts being made throughout the United Nations and otherwise to bring about a lasting peace; and
WHEREAS American fighting men and fighting men of other nations of the United Nations are now engaged in deadly combat with the forces of aggression in Korea, and forces of the United States are stationed elsewhere overseas for the purpose of participating in the defense of the Atlantic Community against aggression; and
WHEREAS the weapons and other materials needed by our armed forces and by those joined with us in the defense of the free world are produced to a great extent in this country, and steel is an indispensable component of substantially all of such weapons and materials; and
WHEREAS steel is likewise indispensable to the carrying out of programs of the Atomic Energy Commission of vital importance to our defense efforts; and
WHEREAS a continuing and uninterrupted supply of steel is also indispensable to the maintenance of the economy of the United States, upon which our military strength depends; and
WHEREAS a controversy has arisen between certain companies in the United States producing and fabricating steel and the elements thereof and certain of their workers represented by the United Steel Workers of America, CIO, regarding terms and conditions of employment; and
WHEREAS the controversy has not been settled through the processes of collective bargaining or through the efforts of the Government, including those of the Wage Stabilization Board, to which the controversy was referred on December 22, 1951, pursuant to Executive Order No. 10233, and a strike has been called for 12:01 A. M., April 9, 1952; and
WHEREAS a work stoppage would immediately jeopardize and imperil our national defense and the defense [p591] of those joined with us in resisting aggression, and would add to the continuing danger of our soldiers, sailors, and airmen engaged in combat in the field; and
WHEREAS, in order to assure the continued availability of steel and steel products during the existing emergency, it is necessary that the United States take possession of and operate the plants, facilities, and other property of the said companies as hereinafter provided:
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:
1. The Secretary of Commerce is hereby authorized and directed to take possession of all or such of the plants, facilities, and other property of the companies named in the list attached hereto, or any part thereof, as he may deem necessary in the interests of national defense, and to operate or to arrange for the operation thereof and to do all things necessary for, or incidental to, such operation.
2. In carrying out this order, the Secretary of Commerce may act through or with the aid of such public or private instrumentalities or persons as he may designate, and all Federal agencies shall cooperate with the Secretary of Commerce to the fullest extent possible in carrying out the purposes of this order.
3. The Secretary of Commerce shall determine and prescribe terms and conditions of employment under which the plants, facilities, and other properties possession of which is taken pursuant to this order shall be operated. The Secretary of Commerce shall recognize the rights of workers to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining, adjustment of grievances, or other mutual aid or protection, provided [p592] that such activities do not interfere with the operation of such plants, facilities, and other properties.
4. Except so far as the Secretary of Commerce shall otherwise provide from time to time, the managements of the plants, facilities, and other properties possession of which is taken pursuant to this order shall continue their functions, including the collection and disbursement of funds in the usual and ordinary course of business in the names of their respective companies and by means of any instrumentalities used by such companies.
5. Except so far as the Secretary of Commerce may otherwise direct, existing rights and obligations of such companies shall remain in full force and effect, and there may be made, in due course, payments of dividends on stock, and of principal, interest, sinking funds, and all other distributions upon bonds, debentures, and other obligations, and expenditures may be made for other ordinary corporate or business purposes.
6. Whenever, in the judgment of the Secretary of Commerce, further possession and operation by him of any plant, facility, or other property is no longer necessary or expedient in the interest of national defense, and the Secretary has reason to believe that effective future operation is assured, he shall return the possession and operation of such plant, facility, or other property to the company in possession and control thereof at the time possession was taken under this order.
7. The Secretary of Commerce is authorized to prescribe and issue such regulations and orders not inconsistent herewith as he may deem necessary or desirable for carrying out the purposes of this order, and he may delegate and authorize subdelegation of such of his functions under this order as he may deem desirable.
Harry S. Truman.
The White House, April 8, 1952. [p593]
1. The power to seize plants under the War Labor Disputes Act ended with the termination of hostilities, proclaimed on Dec. 31, 1946, prior to the incoming of the Eightieth Congress, and the power to operate previously seized plants ended on June 30, 1947, only a week after the enactment of the Labor Management Relations Act over the President's veto. 57 Stat. 163, 165, 50 U.S.C.App. (1946 ed.) § 1503. See 2 Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (published by National Labor Relations Board, 1948), 1145, 1519, 1626.
2. Some of the more directly relevant statements are the following:
In most instances, the force of public opinion should make itself sufficiently felt in this 80-day period to bring about a peaceful termination of the controversy. Should this expectation fail, the bill provides for the President's laying the matter before Congress for whatever legislation seems necessary to preserve the health and safety of the Nation in the crisis.
Senate Report No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15.
"We believe it would be most unwise for the Congress to attempt to adopt laws relating to any single dispute between private parties." Senate Minority Report, id. Part 2, at 17.
In the debates, Senator H. Alexander Smith, a member of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, said,
In the event of a deadlock and a strike is not ended, the matter is referred to the President, who can use his discretion as to whether he will present the matter to the Congress, whether or not the situation is such that emergency legislation is required.
Nothing has been done with respect to the Smith-Connally Act. There is no provision for taking over property or running plants by the Government. We simply provide a procedure which we hope will be effective in 99 out of 100 cases where the health or safety of the people may be affected, and still leave a loophole for congressional action.
93 Cong.Rec. 4281.
The President in his veto message said,
. . . it would be mandatory for the President to transfer the whole problem to the Congress, even if it were not in session. Thus, major economic disputes between employers and their workers over contract terms might ultimately be thrown into the political arena for disposition. One could scarcely devise a less effective method for discouraging critical strikes.
93 Cong.Rec. 7487.
3. Senator Taft said:
If there finally develops a complete national emergency threatening the safety and health of the people of the United States, Congress can pass an emergency law to cover the particular emergency. . . .
We have felt that, perhaps in the case of a general strike, or in the case of other serious strikes, after the termination of every possible effort to resolve the dispute, the remedy might be an emergency act by Congress for that particular purpose.
. . . But while such a bill [for seizure of plants and union funds] might be prepared, I should be unwilling to place such a law on the books until we actually face such an emergency, and Congress applies the remedy for the particular emergency only. Eighty days will provide plenty of time within which to consider the possibility of what should be done, and we believe very strongly that there should not be anything in this law which prohibits finally the right to strike.
93 Cong.Rec. 3835-3836.
4. 93 Cong.Rec. 3637-3645.
5. See, for instance, the statements of James B. Carey, Secretary of the CIO, in opposition to S. 2054, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., which eventually became the War Labor Disputes Act. Central to that Act, of course, was the temporary grant of the seizure power to the President. Mr. Carey then said:
Senator BURTON. If this would continue forever, it might mean the nationalization of industry?
Mr. CAREY. Let us consider it on a temporary basis. How is the law borne by labor? Here is the Government-sponsored strike-breaking agency, and nothing more.
* * * *
Our suggestion of a voluntary agreement of the representatives of industry and labor and Government, participating in calling a conference, is a democratic way. The other one is the imposition of force, the other is the imposition of seizure of certain things for a temporary period; the destruction of collective bargaining, and it would break down labor relations that may have been built up over a long period.
Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2054, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 132.
6. Clearly, the President's message of April 9 and his further letter to the President of the Senate on April 21 do not satisfy this requirement. Cong.Rec. April 9, 1952, pp. 3962-3963; id., April 21, 1952, p. 4192.
7. 64 Stat. 798 et seq., 65 Stat. 131 et seq., 50 U.S.C. App. § 2061 et seq.
8. §§ 501, 502, 64 Stat. 798, 812, 50 U.S.C.App. §§ 2121, 2122.
9. §§ 502, 503, 64 Stat. 798, 812, 50 U.S.C.App. §§ 2122, 2123.
10. The provision of § 502 in S. 3936, as reported by the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, read as follows:
The President is authorized, after consultation with labor and management, to establish such principles and procedures and to take such action as he deems appropriate for the settlement of labor disputes affecting national defense, including the designation of such persons, boards or commissions as he may deem appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.
That language was superseded in the Conference Report by the language that was finally enacted. H.R.Rep. No. 3042, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 16, 35. The change made by the Conference Committee was for the purpose of emphasizing the voluntary nature of the cooperation sought from he public, labor, and management; as Senator Ives explained under repeated questioning, "If any group were to hold out, there would be no agreement [on action to carry out the provisions of this title]." 96 Cong.Rec. 14071. Chairman Maybank of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency said,
The labor disputes title of the Senate was accepted by the House with amendment which merely indicates more specific avenues through which the President may bring labor and management together.
Id. at 14073.
11. S.Rep. No. 2250, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 41; H.R.Rep. No. 3042, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 35. It is hardly necessary to note that Congressional authorization of an agency similar to the War Labor Board does not imply a Congressional grant of seizure power similar to that given the President specifically by § 3 of the War Labor Disputes Act of 1943. The War Labor Board, created by § 7 of the 1943 Act, had only administrative sanctions. See 57 Stat. 163, 166167; see Report of Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, The Disputes Functions of the Wage Stabilization Board, 1951, S.Rep. No. 1037, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 6. The seizure power given by Congress in § 3 of the 1943 Act was given to the President, not to the War Labor Board, and was needed only when the War Labor Board reported it had failed; the seizure power was separate and apart from the War Labor Board machinery for settling disputes. At most, the Defense Production Act does what § 7 of the War Labor Disputes Act did; the omission of any grant of seizure power similar to § 3 is too obvious not to have been conscious. At any rate, the Wage Stabilization Board differs substantially from the earlier War Labor Board. In 1951 the Senate Committee studying the disputes functions of the Wage Stabilization Board pointed out the substantial differences between that Board and its predecessor, and concluded that "The new Wage Stabilization Board . . . does not rely on title V of the Defense Production Act for its authority." S.Rep. No. 1037, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., supra, at 4-6.
12. S.Rep. No. 2250, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 41.
13. See 96 Cong.Rec. 14071.
14. Id. at 12275. Just before the paragraph quoted in the text, Senator Ives had said:
In fact, the courts have upheld the constitutionality of the national emergency provisions of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, which can require that workers stay on the job for at least 80 days when a strike would seriously threaten the national health and safety in peacetime.
By the terms of the pending bill, the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 would be controlling in matters affecting the relationship between labor and management, including collective bargaining. It seems to me, however, that this is as far as we should go in legislation of this type.
15. 16 Fed.Reg. 3503. The disputes functions were not given to the Wage Stabilization Board under Title V, see note 11, supra, but apparently under the more general Title IV, entitled "Price and Wage Stabilization."
16. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor, Disputes Functions of Wage Stabilization Board, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (May 28-June 15, 1951); Hearings before the Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Management Relations of Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Wage Stabilization and Disputes Program, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (May 17-June 7, 1951). The resulting Report of the Senate Committee, S.Rep. No. 1037, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 9, recommended that "Title V of the Defense Production Act be retained," and that
[n]o statutory limitations be imposed on the President's authority to deal with disputes through voluntary machinery; such limitations, we believe, would infringe on the President's constitutional power.
(Emphasis added.) The Committee found, id. at 10, that the
Wage Stabilization Board relies completely on voluntary means for settling disputes and is, therefore, an extension of free collective bargaining. The Board has no powers of legal compulsion.
"Executive Order No. 10233," the Committee found further, "does not in any way run counter to the . . . Taft-Hartley Act. It is simply an additional tool, not a substitute for these laws." Of particular relevance to the present case, the Committee declared:
The recommendations of the Wage Stabilization Board in disputes certified by the President have no compulsive force. The parties are free to disregard recommendations of the Wage Stabilization Board. . . .
There is, of course, the President's authority to seize plants under the Selective Service Act [a power not here used], but this is an authority which exists independently of the Wage Stabilization Board and its disputes-handling functions. In any case, seizure is an extraordinary remedy, and the authority to seize, operates whether or not there is a disputes-handling machinery.
Id. at 5.
17. 97 Cong.Rec. 8390-8415.
18. 65 Stat. 131.
19. Instances of seizure by the President are summarized in Appendix II, post, p. 620.
20. One of President Wilson's seizures has given rise to controversy. In his testimony in justification of the Montgomery Ward seizure during World War II, Attorney General Biddle argued that the World War I seizure of Smith & Wesson could not be supported under any of the World War I statutes authorizing seizure. He thus adduced it in support of the claim of so-called inherent Presidential power of seizure. See Hearings before House Select Committee to Investigate the Seizure of Montgomery Ward, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 167-168. In so doing, he followed the ardor of advocates in claiming everything. In his own opinion to the President, he rested the power to seize Montgomery Ward on the statutory authority of the War Labor Disputes Act, see 40 Op.Atty.Gen. 312 (1944), and the Court of Appeals decision upholding the Montgomery Ward seizure confined itself to that ground. United States v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 150 F.2d 369. What Attorney General Biddle said about Smith & Wesson was, of course, post litem motam. Whether or not the World War I statutes were broad enough to justify that seizure, it is clear that the taking officers conceived themselves as moving within the scope of statute law. See Letter from Administrative Div., Advisory Sec. to War Dep't. Bd. of Appraisers, National Archives, Records of the War Department, Office of the Chief of Ordnance, O.O. 004.002/194 Smith & Wesson, Apr. 2, 1919; n. 3, Appendix II, post, p. 620. Thus, whether or not that seizure was within the statute, it cannot properly be cited as a precedent for the one before us. On this general subject, compare Attorney General Knox's opinion advising President Theodore Roosevelt against the so-called "stewardship" theory of the Presidency. National Archives, Opinions of the Attorney General, Book 31, Oct. 10, 1902 (R.G. 60); Theodore Roosevelt, Autobiography, 388-389; 3 Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 323-366.