| Ashe v. Swenson
(No. 57)
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| Syllabus
| Opinion
[ Stewart ] | Concurrence
[ Black ] | Concurrence
[ Harlan ] | Concurrence
[ Brennan ] | Dissent
[ Burger ] |
| HTML version
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Ashe v. Swenson
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring.
If I were to judge this case under the traditional standards of Fourteenth Amendment due process, I would adhere to the decision in Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958), believing that, regardless of the reach of the federal rule of collateral estoppel, it would have been open to a state court to treat the issue differently. However, having acceded in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 744 (1969), to the decision in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), which, over my dissent, held that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on the States the standards of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, I am satisfied that, on this present record, Ashe's acquittal in the first trial brought double jeopardy standards into play. Hence, I join the Court's opinion. In doing so, I wish to make explicit my understanding that the Court's opinion in no way intimates that the Double Jeopardy Clause embraces to any degree the "same transaction" concept reflected in the concurring opinion of my Brother BRENNAN.