skip navigation


San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (No. 71-1332)
___
Syllabus

Opinion
[ Powell ]
Concurrence
[ Stewart ]
Dissent
[ Brennan ]
Dissent
[ White ]
Dissent
[ Marshall ]
HTML version
PDF version
HTML version
PDF version
HTML version
PDF version
HTML version
PDF version
HTML version
PDF version
HTML version
PDF version

BRENNAN, J., Dissenting Opinion

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


411 U.S. 1

San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS


No. 71-1332 Argued: October 12, 1972 --- Decided: March 21, 1973

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.

Although I agree with my Brother WHITE that the Texas statutory scheme is devoid of any rational basis, and, for that reason, is violative of the Equal Protection Clause, I also record my disagreement with the Court's rather distressing assertion that a right may be deemed "fundamental" for the purposes of equal protection analysis only if it is "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." Ante at 33-34. As my Brother MARSHALL convincingly demonstrates, our prior cases stand for the proposition that "fundamentality" is, in large measure, a function of the right's importance in terms of the effectuation of those rights which are in fact, constitutionally guaranteed. Thus,

[a]s the nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional [p63] interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis must be adjusted accordingly.

Post at 102-103.

Here, there can be no doubt that education is inextricably linked to the right to participate in the electoral process and to the rights of free speech and association guaranteed by the First Amendment. See post at 111-115. This being so, any classification affecting education must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny, and since even the State concedes that the statutory scheme now before us cannot pass constitutional muster under this stricter standard of review, I can only conclude that the Texas school-financing scheme is constitutionally invalid.