| Plyler v. Doe
(No. 80-1538)
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| Syllabus
| Opinion
[ Brennan ] | Concurrence
[ Marshall ] | Concurrence
[ Blackmun ] | Concurrence
[ Powell ] | Dissent
[ Burger ] |
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Plyler v. Doe
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring.
While I join the Court opinion, I do so without in any way retreating from my opinion in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70-133 (1973) (dissenting opinion). I continue to believe that an individual's interest in education is fundamental, and that this view is amply supported
by the unique status accorded public education by our society, and by the close relationship between education and some of our most basic constitutional values. [p231]
Id. at 111. Furthermore, I believe that the facts of these cases demonstrate the wisdom of rejecting a rigidified approach to equal protection analysis, and of employing an approach that allows for varying levels of scrutiny depending upon
the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.
Id. at 99. See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-521 (1970) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). It continues to be my view that a class-based denial of public education is utterly incompatible with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.