Women and Justice: Keywords

Domestic Case Law

Cправа № 509/3010/19 (Case No. 509/3010/19) цивільного суду у складі Верховного Суду (Civil Cassation Court within the Supreme Court of Ukraine) (2022)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Property and inheritance rights

The appellant sued his ex-wife, the respondent, regarding the division of property acquired during the marriage as the ex-spouses’ joint property. The appellant noted that during their marriage, the spouses accumulated funds that were kept in the respondent’s bank account. However, immediately after the divorce, the respondent independently managed the funds and bought an apartment. The appellant’s main argument was that, according to Ukrainian family law, the dissolution of marriage does not terminate the right of joint co-ownership of property acquired during the marriage. When the spouses’ jointly owned property is divided, each spouse shall receive an equal share, unless otherwise envisaged by the marriage contract. Thus, the appellant argued that half of the money belonged to him. The respondent claimed that the money was her private property because it was a gift from her friend from the Slovak Republic. The first-instance court satisfied the appellant’s claim, noting that, according to Ukrainian legislation, the deed of gift agreement should have been, but was not, notarized, rendering it null and void. Consequently, the money was the joint property of the spouses. The Court of Appeal overturned this decision. The Supreme Court also supported the position that the court of first instance erroneously satisfied the husband's claim because, as a gift from a citizen of the Slovak Republic, the Ukrainian courts should apply Slovak law, which does not require notarization of the deed of gift agreement. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the money was the woman's personal property and could not be divided.

Скаржник звернувся до суду з позовом до своєї колишньої дружини (відповідача) про поділ майна, нажитого за час шлюбу як спільної сумісної власності подружжя. Скаржник зазначив, що за час шлюбу подружжя накопичило кошти, які зберігалися на банківському рахунку відповідача. Проте, одразу після розірвання шлюбу, відповідач самостійно розпорядилась коштами та придбала квартиру. Основним аргументом скаржника було те, що відповідно до сімейного законодавства України розірвання шлюбу не припиняє права спільної сумісної власності на майно, набуте за час шлюбу. При поділі майна, що є спільною сумісною власністю подружжя, вважається, що частки кожного із подружжя є рівними, якщо інше не встановлено домовленістю між ними або договором. Таким чином, скаржник стверджував, що половина грошей належить йому. Відповідач стверджувала, що гроші є її приватною власністю, оскільки це подарунок її друга із Словацької Республіки. Суд першої інстанції задовольнив позов скаржника, зазначивши, що відповідно до законодавства України договір дарування мав бути (проте не був) нотаріально посвідчений, що робить його нікчемним. Отже, гроші були спільною власністю подружжя. Апеляційний суд скасував це рішення. Верховний Суд також підтримав позицію про те, що суд першої інстанції помилково задовольнив позов чоловіка, оскільки щодо подарунку громадянина Словацької Республіки українські суди мають застосовувати законодавство Словаччини, яке не вимагає нотаріального посвідчення договору дарування. Таким чином, Верховний суд дійшов висновку, що гроші є особистою власністю жінки і не підлягають розподілу.



Cправа №310/6618/17 (Case No. 310/6618/17) цивільного суду у складі Верховного Суду (Civil Cassation Court within the Supreme Court of Ukraine) (2021)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Property and inheritance rights

The plaintiff sued his ex-wife, the appellant, and requested recognition that a piece of real estate was his private property. The plaintiff noted that he and his wife were in a registered marriage for a certain period. The plaintiff made money as an individual entrepreneur (in Ukraine, this term means an individual that owns his or her business and possesses all the profit). While running his business, he acquired real estate and registered title. The plaintiff invested his own money in this property. The appellant believed that due to the fact that the plaintiff acquired the property during their marriage, the real estate was the joint property of the spouses and should be split between them. Rejecting the appellant’s arguments, the court of first instance concluded that, as the plaintiff acquired the disputed property using his own money, the property belonged only to him, as she did not prove that the property was acquired as a result of their joint work or that her funds were invested in its acquisition. The Court of Appeal left this decision unchanged. The Supreme Court slightly changed the motivational part of the decisions of the first-instance court, as well as Court of Appeal, accepting that the property of the individual entrepreneur can be joint property of the spouses, provided that it was either bought by the spouses together, or invested in by both spouses. Considering that the appellant did not prove that the property was acquired during their marriage, nor that they both invested in the property, the Court held that it belonged only to the plaintiff.

Позивач подав до суду на свою колишню дружину (скаржницю) та просив визнати, що нерухоме майно є його приватною власністю. Позивач зазначив, що певний період вони з дружиною перебували в зареєстрованому шлюбі. Позивач заробляв гроші як фізична особа-підприємець (в Україні під цим терміном розуміється фізична особа, яка є власником свого бізнесу та володіє всім прибутком). Під час ведення бізнесу він придбав нерухомість і зареєстрував право власності на неї. Позивач інвестував свої власні кошти в це нерухоме майно. Скаржниця вважала, що у зв'язку з тим, що Позивач набув майно під час шлюбу, нерухоме майно є спільною сумісною власністю подружжя і підлягає розподілу між ними. Суд першої інстанції відхилив доводи скаржниці та дійшов висновку, що, оскільки позивач придбав спірне майно за власні кошти, це майно належить лише йому, оскільки вона не довела, що це майно було набуте в результаті їх спільної праці або, що її кошти були вкладені в його придбання. Апеляційний суд залишив це рішення без змін. Верховний Суд дещо змінив мотивувальну частину рішення суду першої інстанції, а також апеляційного суду, вказавши, що майно фізичної особи-підприємця може бути спільною сумісною власністю подружжя за умови, що воно було придбано обома подружжя або в нього було інвестовано кошти обох подружжя. Зважаючи на те, що скаржниця не довела ні того, що це майно було придбано під час їхнього шлюбу, ні того, що вони обидва інвестували у це майно, Суд постановив, що воно належало лише позивачу.



Cправа №456/848/16-ц (Case No.456/848/16-ц) цивільного суду у складі Верховного Суду (Civil Cassation Court within the Supreme Court) (2020)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage

The plaintiff requested that the court grant his divorce from his wife, the respondent. He argued that their married life had ended. After the respondent took the children and his property and left him in 2014, she lived separately from plaintiff, did not have marital relations with him, nor run a joint household with him. The first-instance court granted the divorce and concluded that the family had broken up and continuing the marriage was against everyone’s interests. The Court of Appeal left the decision of the first instance unchanged. The respondent insisted on preserving the marriage and filed the cassation appeal to the Supreme Court, claiming that the courts of previous instances had no right to interfere in her relationship with her husband. The Family Code of Ukraine allows either spouse to terminate the marriage. Forcing the termination or continuation of marriage, or forcing sex through physical or psychological violence, is an abuse of the right of the wife or husband to freedom and personal inviolability and may have additional legal implications. Therefore, the courts must determine the actual spousal relationship and any valid reasons for divorce. If it is established that the future joint life of the spouses and preservation of the marriage would be contrary to the interests of one of them, the court should terminate the marriage. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no interference in married life by the courts and under such circumstances there were grounds for dissolution of the marriage, as its continuation was contrary to the plaintiff’s interests.

Позивач просив суд розірвати його шлюб із дружиною (відповідачем). Він стверджував, що їхнє подружнє життя закінчилося, і що саме відповідач винна в тому, що їхня сім’я розпалася. Після того, як у 2014 році відповідач забрала дітей, його майно та покинула його, вона проживала окремо від позивача, не перебувала з ним у шлюбних стосунках, не вела спільного господарства. Суд першої інстанції задовольнив позов про розірвання шлюбу та дійшов висновку, що сім'я фактично розпалася і продовження шлюбу суперечить інтересам кожного з подружжя. Апеляційний суд залишив рішення першої інстанції без змін. Відповідач наполягала на збереженні шлюбу та подала касаційну скаргу до Верховного Суду, стверджуючи, що суди попередніх інстанцій не мають права втручатися у її стосунки з чоловіком. Сімейний кодекс України передбачає право кожного з поружжя припинити шлюбні відносини. Примушування до припинення шлюбних відносин, примушування до їх збереження, в тому числі примушування до статевого зв'язку за допомогою фізичного або психічного насильства, є порушенням права дружини, чоловіка на свободу та особисту недоторканість і може мати наслідки, встановлені законом. Таким чином, суди повинні визначити фактичні подружні стосунки та будь-які поважні причини розірвання шлюбу. Якщо буде встановлено, що подальше спільне життя подружжя та збереження шлюбу суперечило б інтересам одного з них, суд повинен розірвати шлюб. Тому Верховний Суд дійшов висновку про відсутність втручання судів у подружнє життя і, що за таких обставин були підстави для розірвання шлюбу, оскільки його продовження суперечило інтересам позивача. Тому суди мають визначати фактичні взаємини подружжя, дійсні причини позову про розірвання шлюбу. Суд постановляє рішення про розірвання шлюбу, якщо буде встановлено, що подальше спільне життя подружжя і збереження шлюбу суперечило б інтересам одного з них. Таким чином, Верховний Суд дійшов висновку про відсутність втручання судів у подружнє життя і, що за таких обставин були підстави для розірвання шлюбу, оскільки його продовження суперечило інтересам позивача.



T. (D.) v T. (C.) (2002)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Property and inheritance rights

In this case, the Supreme Court articulated its view of the nature of marriage and how the value of the contributions of the spouses should relate to property entitlements under Irish law. Referencing the Family Law (Divorcer) Act 1996, the Supreme Court noted that the legislature had not made any mandatory requirements regarding the division of assets in divorce and judicial separation cases; discretion had been left to the court to consider what would be the best and most just resolution of the case at hand. Appellate courts should, to a certain degree, give latitude to the discretion of the trial judge in these matters. The parties had a “turbulent” marriage. During the marriage, the respondent-wife: sold her pre-marital home (the proceeds of which were used as marital property), significantly pulled back from her career as a general practitioner focus on the marriage and couple’s children, and worked as a receptionist for her husband’s medical practice to save him money. The applicant-husband had affairs with multiple women, then filed for divorce when he had a child with another woman and decided to marry her. He transferred the family’s house, including some of the art and furnishings, to the respondent and paid about ₤400 per week in child support, which the High Court ordered increased to ₤800 per week. The Court stated that courts should incorporate the value of a spouse’s work performed at home as well as the factors listed in the Family Law Act (including but not limited to income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources, any physical or mental disability of either spouse, past and future contributions each spouse has made – or is likely to make – to the family welfare, and the conduct of the spouses). In this case, the applicant-husband had assets of at least ₤14 million and a current salary of about ₤210,000. The respondent-wife had about ₤1 million and uncertain salary; she requested between 33-50% of the applicant’s assets and a pension adjustment order. The High Court granted the respondent ₤5 million to be paid over 18 months and 55% of the applicant’s pension. On appeal, the applicant asked the Court to give greater weight to, among other factors, the facts (i) that he transferred 30% of his assets to the respondent when the marriage broke down and (ii) that he would have new responsibilities in his next marriage. The Court was of the view that ‘equality’ did not apply in this context, but that the courts are obliged to make ‘proper provision’ for both spouses having regard to the circumstances. In this case, the Court affirmed that the respondent was entitled 38% (approximately ₤5 million) of the total net assets, but revised the pension adjustment to 49-51% in favour of the respondent.



戸籍登録変更に関する異議申立書:28212731 (Appeal Concerning an Application for Permission to Revise a Family Registration, ID 28212731) 最高裁第三小法廷(2013年)(Third Petit Branch of the Supreme Court) (2013)


Gender discrimination, LGBTIQ

Person X1 transitioned from female to male. X1 registered as a male and married a woman, X2, in 2008. In 2009, X2 bore a child. In 2012, X1 applied to have the family registry reflect that X1 was the child’s father and that the child was born while X1 and X2 were married. The ward mayor in charge of changes to family registries held that there was a problem with the application because Article 774 of the Civil Law was inapplicable to the child’s situation as the child was not related by blood to X1. X1 did not comply with the ward mayor’s request to fix the application, so the ward mayor filled in the family registry for the child with a blank for father and a note that the child was X2’s oldest son. X1 and X2 filed suit to have X1 added as the child’s father on the grounds that the child should be presumed to be a “legitimately” born child based on Article 772 of the Civil Law. The Supreme Court held that the child should be presumed to be the son of X1, overruling the lower court and the ward mayor’s decision. The court reasoned that under Article 3.1 of the Gender Identity Disorder Law, a transgender man should be treated for all purposes under the law as a man. The court held that this includes being able to marry and have a “legitimate” child. Following this decision, the Ministry of Justice issued a notification on 27 January, 2014 directing that this procedure be followed for any similarly situated families. Subsequently, the state changed the family registry for 45 such couples to reflect that both parents are their children’s parents.

X1は女性だったが、男性になるため、性転換手術を受けた。その後、彼は男性として登録し、2008年に女性のX2と結婚した。その翌年、X2は子どもを出産した。2012年、X1は、X1が子どもの父親であること、子どもがX1とX2の婚姻中に生まれたことを戸籍に反映させることを地方公共団体に請求した。戸籍変更を担当する区長は、子どもがX1と血縁関係にないことから、民法774条の適用を受けられないため、申請に問題があると、子の戸籍に父の欄を空欄にして、子がX2の長男であると記入した。X1とX2は、子が民法772条に基づいて「嫡出子」と推定されるべきであるとして、X1を子の父として加えることを要求し提訴した。最高裁は、X1の子と推定すべきであるとし、下級審および区長の判断を棄却し、「性同一性障害の性別の取り扱いの特例に関する法律」第3条第1項に基づき、トランスジェンダーの男性は、法に基づき、あらことで男性として扱われるべきであるとした。これには、結婚して「正当に」子どもを産むことができることも含まれるとした。この判決を受けて、法務省は2014年1月27日に、同様の状況にある家族に対してこの手続きを行うよう指示する通達を出した。その後、国は、そのようなカップル45組の戸籍を訂正した。



平成25年(許)5 (2013 (Kyo) No. 5) 最高裁 (Supreme Court of Japan) (2013)


LGBTIQ

The plaintiff-husband, who transitioned from female to male, and the plaintiff-wife requested the local public agency to amend their family registry to state the plaintiff-husband as the father of their child. The child was born by artificial insemination and had no blood relationship with the plaintiff-husband. The Supreme Court determined that, since the child was conceived by the plaintiff-wife during marriage, he is presumed to be a child of the plaintiff-husband under the Civil Code, and ordered the family registry to be amended.

本件は、性同一性障害で女性から男性に性転換した原告である夫と原告の妻が、夫を子の父とする戸籍訂正を地方公共団体に対して求めた事案である。子は人工授精で生まれ、夫との血縁関係が存在しなかった。最高裁は、子は原告の妻が婚姻中に妊娠したものであるから、民法上、原告である夫の子であると推定されると判断し、戸籍の訂正を命じた。



Lehdeaho v. SHO, PS Chung, Lahore and others Supreme Court of Pakistan (2017)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage

The petitioner was a mother who moved with her husband, the respondent, to Canada with their three minor children in 2009. The respondent moved back to Lahore, Pakistan and the children stayed with the petitioner in Canada. The respondent wanted the entire family to move back to Lahore. To this end, he approached the Guardian Court in Lahore and declared himself as the guardian of the person and property of his children. When they came to visit him, he refused to let the children go back to Canada. Under the Guardians & Wards Act of 1890, the Guardian Court is any lower court that can hear an application for custody and guardianship of children. The respondent proceeded to file an application for custody of the children before the Guardian Court. The petitioner was in Canada when she received the notice of the proceedings for custody and unable to immediately enter Pakistan as her visa had expired. In her absence, the Guardian Court passed an order giving the custody of the children to the respondent until the petitioner could appear before the Guardian Court. The petitioner filed an application to the High Court for custody of her children, which was dismissed as the matter was still pending before the Guardian Court. The High Court’s reasoning was that because the Guardian Court is where the evidence and witnesses are evaluated, it is the appropriate forum for the case to be heard for custody of children. The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered whether the High Court had jurisdiction to hear the petition on custody matters pending a final decision by the Guardian Court. The Supreme Court observed from previous case law that the Guardian Court is the final arbiter on questions of custody of a child. However, this should not disadvantage a person illegally deprived of custody of a minor child from a remedy to regain custody pending adjudication by the Guardian Court. On this basis, the Supreme Court held that the High Court has the right to pass orders where it would be in the best interest and welfare of the minor. The Supreme Court also held that the High Court has jurisdiction to restore custody to the person lawfully holding such custody while the Guardian Court gives its final orders. After considering that the children wanted to move back to Canada with their mother, the order was passed in her favor.



周某与杨某1离婚纠纷,江苏省无锡市中级人民法院 (In re Zhou & Yang Divorce Litigation) Intermediate People's Court of Wuxi Municipality (2017)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Domestic and intimate partner violence

The appellant-wife appealed to the Intermediate People’s Court of Wuxi Municipality, Jiangsu Province in relation to the lower court’s refusal to grant a divorce. The appellant alleged that her marriage with the appellee was irreparably broken and that he had committed domestic violence against her. The appellant alleged that the domestic violence was corroborated by their daughter’s testimony and photographic evidence. The court held that even though the appellee might have beaten the appellant on at least one occasion, under the legal definition, domestic violence must constitute continuous multiple-time battery rather than [one occasional][1] conduct. Since the evidence submitted by the appellant was insufficient to demonstrate that the appellee’s conduct caused harmful consequences to the appellant, the court refused to grant their divorce. The court also admonished the appellee to fulfill his responsibility as a husband and to stop his "bad habits."

离婚、家庭暴力

上诉人周某因与被上诉人杨某1离婚纠纷一案,不服无锡市惠山区不准予双方离婚的判决,向江苏省无锡市中级人民法院提起上诉。周某称双方感情确已破裂,并且杨某1对其存在家暴行为。上诉人称双方女儿的证言与照片证据证明了家暴行为的存在。法院认为,根据证据,虽然不排除杨某1有打过周某的可能性,但家庭暴力不只是一次偶然性的行为,而是持续性多次施暴的行为。因为周某提交的证据不足以证明被上诉人的行为对周某造成了伤害,法院拒绝了周某的上诉请求。法院同时要求杨某1作为丈夫有所担当,戒除生活中的不良习惯。

[1] Note to draft: This concept is unclear. The exact translation of the Mandarin phrase would be “one occasional conduct.” From the context of the opinion, it appears that this means that occasional conduct, even if more than once, may not be sufficient if it is not indicative of a pattern of abuse.



Meera Dhungana v Office of Prime Minister and Council of Ministers and Others Supreme Court of Nepal (2007)


Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The petitioner filed to amend a provision in pension payments by the Nepalese Army that withheld payments from married daughters. The Court ruled to invalidate this measure based on the grounds that pension payments to children were stopped at 18 years, before the legal age of marriage, making it obsolete. However, the Court also acknowledged that this provision was contrary to Article 11 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal which guarantees equal rights to all, in particular highlighting that equality is meant in practical terms sometimes necessitating positive discrimination. By interpreting Article 11 of the Constitution to include positive discrimination, this case opens the door to proactive human rights defense measures.



Legislation

قانون الأحوال الشخصية الأردني (Personal Status Law of 2019) (2019)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Forced and early marriage, Harmful traditional practices, Property and inheritance rights

Article 10 (A) raised the legal marriage age to 18 from the age of 15. However, Paragraph B of Article 10 carves out discretion for the Judge, upon approval of the Chief Justice, to permit the marriage of anyone who is at least 16 years old if it is deemed to be in his or her best interest based on the Judge’s determination. The person would also acquire a legal capacity in relation to marriage and divorce matters. Article 11 expressly forbids the formation of a marriage agreement where the man is more than 20 years older than the woman, except in the circumstance where the judge has verified the woman’s consent. Before authorizing a marriage, Article 13 requires that: 1) the man has the financial capacity to pay his fiancée’s dowry; 2) the man has the financial capacity to provide marital alimony; and 3) the man disclose to his fiancée that he is already married to another woman; and 4) the court inform the man’s wife or wives of the new marriage contract. In addition, according to Article 21, for a marriage to be valid, the man has to be compatible with the woman in terms of religion and financial capacity. Financial capacity is determined by the capacity to provide dowry promptly and marital alimony if necessary. Article 19 provides that women over the age 18 may marry without the consent of their guardian, if they are of sane mind. Article 37 further allows women to make any stipulations in her marriage contract as she desires, as long as these are not prohibited by Sharia law, do not affect the rights of others, and are not otherwise unlawful. These could include that the husband not prevent her from working outside the home or expel her from the country. Violations of such legal stipulations may result in the nullification of the marriage, and she would be entitled to all her rights associated to the marriage. Not providing marital alimony to the wife (Article 115), and the absence of the husband for a year or more when his place of residence is known (Article 119), not providing marital dowry (Article 139) are all valid grounds for nullifying the marriage according to this Law.

رفعت الفقرة (أ) من المادة 10 سن الزواج ليصبح 18 عام بعدما كان 15 عام، إلا أن الفقرة (ب) من ذات المادة جعلت هناك حالات خاصة يمكن للقاضي فيها السماح بالزواج لمن بلغ عمر 16 عام وذلك في حال كان الزواج ضرورة تقتضيه المصلحة، بعد موافقة قاضي القضاة، وفقًا لتعليمات يصدرها لهذه الغاية. ويكتسب، من تزوج وفق ما سبق، الأهلية الكاملة في كل ما يتعلق بالزواج والفرقة وآثارهما. أما المادة 11 فقد منعت الرجل من عقد زواج على امرأة يكبرها بأكثر من 20 عام دون تأكد القاضي من رضاها واختيارها. بينما أشارت المادة 13 إلى أنه يجب على القاضي التأكد من عدة أمور قبل إجراء عقد زواج المتزوج وهي قدر الزوج المالية على المهر وعلى الإنفاق على ما تجب عليه النفقة، بالإضافة إلى معرفة المخطوبة أن خاطبها متزوج بأخرى. كما أوجبت ذات المادة على المحكمة إبلاغ الزوجات الآوائل بعقد الزواج الجديد بعد إتمامه وذلك بحسب قانون أصول المحاكمات الشرعية. كما نصت المادة 21 أن الكفاءة قس الدين والمال بين المرأة والرجل هي شرط للزوم الزواج، وكفاءة المال تقاس بقدرة الزوج على المهر المعجل ونفقة الزوجة. وبينت المادة 19 أن موافقة الولي لا تشترط في زواج المرأة الثيب العاقلة المتجاوزة من العمر 18 سنة. وذكرت المادة 37 إلى أنه إذا اشترطت الزوجة على زوجها شرطًا تتحق لها به مصلحة غير محظورة شرعًا ولا يمس حق غيرها، مثل أن لا يخرجها من بلدها أو عدم الزواج بغيرها أو أن لا يمنعها من العمل، يعتبر الشرط صحيح وعدم الوفاء بالشروط فسخ العقد بطلب الزوجة ولها أن تطالب بسائر الحقوق الزوجية. عدم تزويد المرأة بالنفقة الزوجية (مادة 115)، وغياب الزوج عن زوجته سنة فأكثر مع معرفة مكان إقامته (مادة 119)، وعجز الزوج عن دفع المهر بعضه أو كله، جميعها أسباب تجعل للمرأة الحق في أن تطلب من القاضي فسخ الزواج.



Loi No. 2004-439 du 26 Mai 2004 relative au divorce (Law relating to divorce) (2004)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Property and inheritance rights

Article 22 modified the French Civil Code, establishing a new civil law for eviction of a violent spouse from the matrimonial home. Specifically, the law amended the French Civil Code to provide that, where a violent spouse puts their spouse or children in danger, the judge may order separate residence, indicating which spouse may continue to live in the matrimonial home. Absent special circumstances, it is the violent spouse who should be ordered to leave the matrimonial home.

Article 22 modifie le Code Civil français, en établissant une nouvelle loi civile par rapport à l’expulsion d’un conjoint violent du logement conjugal. En particulier, la loi modifie le Code Civil Français, pour donner le droit à un juge de préciser que si un des conjoints est violent et met l’autre conjoint ou les enfants en danger, le juge peut avoir le pouvoir de déclarer que seul un des conjoints puisse continuer à vivre dans la maison conjugale. Absent des circonstances particulières, c’est toujours le conjoint violent qui devra être ordonné de partir du logement conjugal.



Domestic Relations Law (1973)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Domestic and intimate partner violence, Gender discrimination, Property and inheritance rights

The Domestic Relations Law of 1973 governs various aspects of marriage, divorce, and custody of children—while also providing protections for women’s property rights in marriage. The statute sets forth the requirements for a valid marriage, procedures to obtain a marriage license, duties and liabilities in marriage, guardianship and adoption of children, and the procedures to obtain a divorce. Chapter 2 outlines the requirements for a valid marriage. §2.2 provides that when men reach 21 years old and women reach 18 years old, they are per se capable of entering into marriage. §2.2 prohibits marriage of those under 16 years old. §3.4 provides that a woman retains the property she owns at the time of her marriage or receives during the marriage. §3.5 provides that a woman has the right to sue her husband for the injury caused by him during the marriage. Contrary to the law in most countries, §4.1 mandates that both parents have equal custody rights when they live in the same household, but that the husband becomes the sole custodian of the children upon their separation. §5.3 provides, however, that the wife is responsible to support the children when the husband is dead or cannot be found. §6.1 provides that bigamous and incestuous relationships are void marriages. §8.1 outlines the grounds for divorce, including inhuman treatment that causes danger to the plaintiff-spouse’s physical and mental well-being, the defendant-spouse’s desertion of the plaintiff-spouse for a period of one or more years, the defendant-spouse’s adultery, or incompatibility of temper that results in danger to a spouse. With respect to divorce, the Supreme Court of Liberia has affirmed that a court has discretion to deny a divorce if the plaintiff is responsible for the incompatibility (see, e.g., Korkoya). §13.2 provides that injury caused to the wife in the domestic relationship may subject the husband to civil compensatory damages and punitive damages.



23 Pa. C.S.A. § 3301, Domestic Relations - Grounds for Divorce (1990)


Divorce and dissolution of marriage, Domestic and intimate partner violence

Under Pennsylvania law, a divorce can be either “fault-based” or “no-fault.” Grounds for a “fault-based” divorce include the following: abandonment (unmoving spouse has left the home) without a reasonable cause for a period of one or more years; adultery; cruel and barbarous treatment (unmoving spouse has treated movant in a way that puts his/her life or health at risk); bigamy (movant’s spouse married movant without first divorcing his/her spouse); imprisonment for two or more years; or movant’s spouse has acted in a way that made movant’s life unbearable or extremely difficult. Grounds for a “no-fault” divorce include the following: insanity or a serious mental disorder that resulted in confinement in a mental institution for at least 18 months immediately before the commencement of a divorce action; or where a complaint has been filed alleging that the marriage is “irretrievably broken.” When the grounds for divorce is that the marriage is “irretrievably broken,” the court may find that there is a “reasonable prospect of reconciliation.” If the court makes such a finding, it will continue the matter for up to 120 days, but not less than 90 days, unless the parties agree to a longer period. During this continuation period, if either party requests it, the court will require up to a maximum of three counseling sessions.



International Case Law

Case of Airey v. Ireland European Court of Human Rights (1979)


Domestic and intimate partner violence, International law

The petitioner, a domestic violence survivor, could not find affordable legal assistance to appear before a court. The Court ruled that member states must guarantee effective access to the courts, including access to counsel.



Гарнага проти України (Garnaga v. Ukraine) European Court of Human Rights (Європейський суд з прав людини) (2013)


Gender discrimination, International law

The applicant intended to change her patronymic (this term means a part of a personal name was traditionally derived from the name of the father of the person concerned) to disassociate herself from her biological father and associate herself more closely with her stepfather and half-brother. Despite the fact that the woman successfully changed her surname to the surname of her stepfather, she was not allowed to change her patronymic. The authorities' main argument was that new legislation prohibited such a change, which the applicant argued was an illegal and unjustified restriction of her rights. She appealed the decision to the local court, which concluded that the state authorities acted in accordance with the law, after which a change of a patronymic was only legally possible when the father of the person concerned had previously changed his forename. The appellate court and the Higher Administrative Court upheld the decision of the first-instance court. The woman appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), alleging that there was a violation of her right to private and family life under Article 8 of the Convention on Human Rights. The ECtHR drew attention to the fact that the Ukrainian legislation regulating change of a forename or surname was flexible, but did not provide sufficient reasons for the restrictions on changing the patronymic. Thus, the ECtHR held that authorities failed to comply with their obligations under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights by denying her right to change the patronymic, which was an important aspect of woman`s private and family life. In the most recent version of the Civil Code, the right to change one`s patronymic is established without restriction.

Заявниця мала намір змінити своє по батькові (цей термін означає частину особистого імені, що традиційно походить від імені батька відповідної особи), щоб відмежуватися від свого біологічного батька та більш тісно пов’язати себе із вітчимом та неповнорідним братом. Незважаючи на те, що заявниця успішно змінила своє прізвище на прізвище свого вітчима, їй не дозволили змінити по батькові. Основним аргументом уповноважених осіб було те, що нове законодавство забороняло таку зміну, що, на думку заявниці, було незаконним та необґрунтованим обмеженням її права. Жінка оскаржила відмову до місцевого суду, який дійшов висновку, що державні органи діяли у відповідності до закону, який визначав, що зміна по батькові можлива тільки у тому випадку, коли батько такої особи попередньо змінив своє ім’я. Суди апеляційної інстанції та Вищий адміністративний суд залишили рішення суду першої інстанції без змін. Жінка звернулася до Європейського суду з прав людини (“ЄСПЛ”), стверджуючи, що мало місце порушення її права на приватне та сімейне життя відповідно до статті 8 Конвенції з прав людини. ЄСПЛ звернув увагу на те, що українське законодавство, яке регулювало зміну імені чи прізвища було гнучким, але не містило достатніх підстав для обмежень щодо зміни по батькові. Таким чином, ЄСПЛ постановив, що органи влади не виконали своїх зобов’язань за статтею 8 Європейської конвенції з прав людини, відмовивши їй у праві змінити по батькові, яке було важливим аспектом приватного та сімейного життя жінки. В останній редакції Цивільного кодексу право на зміну по батькові встановлено без обмежень.