Syllabus | Opinion [ Stevens ] | Concurrence [ Opinion of Breyer ] | Concurrence [ Scalia ] | Concurrence [ Thomas ] | Other [ Opinion of OConnor ] |
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PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTUR-ERS OF AMERICA, PETITIONER v. PETER E. WALSH, ACTING COMMISSIONER, MAINE DEPARTMENT
OF HUMAN SERVICES, et al.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
[May 19, 2003]
Justice Breyer, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join Parts IIII and Part VI of the Courts opinion and Parts IV and VII of the pluralitys opinion. I also agree with Part Vs conclusion. The District Courts entry of a preliminary injunction rested upon a determination that federal Medicaid law pre-empted the Maine Rx program as long as Maines prior authorization program posed some obstacle,
To prevail, petitioner ultimately must demonstrate that Maines program would seriously compromise important federal interests. Arkansas Elec. Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Commn, 461 U.S. 375, 389 (1983). Cf. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 422423 (1970). Petitioner consequently cannot obtain a preliminary injunction simply by showing minimal or quite modest harm
even though Maine offered no evidence of countervailing Medicaid-related benefit, post, at 5 (OConnor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The relevant statutory language, after all, expressly permits prior authorization programs, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r8(d)(1), and Congress may well have believed that such programs, in general, help Medicaid by generating savings. See ante, at 36, and n. 7 (majority opinion). That being so, Congress would not have intended to forbid prior authorization programs virtually per sei.e., on the showing of slight harmeven if no specific Medicaid-related benefit is apparent in a particular case.
I recognize that petitioner presented evidence to the District Court that could have justified a stronger conclusion. E.g., App. 57, 103104. Cf. Brief for Legal Services Organizations Representing Medicaid Beneficiaries as Amici Curiae 14. Yet the District Courts preliminary injunction nonetheless rests upon premises that subsequent developments have made clear are unrealistic. For one thing, despite Maines initial failure to argue the matter, Maines program may further certain Medicaid-related objectives, at least to some degree. Ante, at 1618 (plurality opinion). For another, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (whose views are highly relevant to the question before us, infra, at 3) has indicated that state programs somewhat similar to Maines may prove con-
sistent with Medicaid objectives, and the Secretary has approved at least one such program. Ante, at 14, n. 30 (plurality opinion); Letter from Theodore B. Olson, Solicitor General, to William K. Suter, Clerk of the Court (Jan. 10, 2003). As a result, it is now apparent that proper determination of the pre-emption question will demand a more careful balancing of Medicaid-related harms and benefits than the District Court undertook. Cf. California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490, 506 (1990) (finding a state law pre-empted where it would disturb and conflict with the balance embodied in [a] considered federal agency determination). These post-entry considerations, along with the general importance of the pre-emption question, convince me that we should not overlook the District Courts technical misstatement of the proper legal standard, and that we should therefore affirm the Court of Appeals judgment vacating the injunction.
By vacating the injunction, we shall also help ensure that the District Court takes account of the Secretarys views in further proceedings that may involve a renewed motion for a preliminary injunction. It is important that the District Court do so. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) administers the Medicaid program. Institutionally speaking, that agency is better able than a court to assemble relevant facts (e.g., regarding harm caused to present Medicaid patients) and to make relevant predictions (e.g., regarding furtherance of Medicaid-related goals). And the law grants significant weight to any legal conclusion by the Secretary as to whether a program such as Maines is consistent with Medicaids objectives. See, e.g., Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). Cf. post, at 67 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
The Medicaid statute sets forth a method through which Maine may obtain those views. A participating State must file a Medicaid plan with HHS and obtain HHS approval. 42 U.S.C. § 1396. A State must also promptly file a plan amendment to reflect any [m]aterial changes in State law, organization, or policy, or in the States operation of the Medicaid program. 42 CFR § 430.12(c) (2002). And the Secretary has said that a statute like Maines is a significant component of a state plan with respect to which Maine is expected to file an amendment. App. to Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 48a.
In addition, the legal doctrine of primary jurisdiction permits a court itself to refer a question to the Secretary. That doctrine seeks to produce better informed and uniform legal rulings by allowing courts to take advantage of an agencys specialized knowledge, expertise, and central position within a regulatory regime. United States v. Western Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 6365 (1956). No fixed formula exists for the doctrines application. Id., at 64. Rather, the question in each instance is whether a case raises issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges, but within the purview of an agencys responsibilities; whether the limited functions of review by the judiciary are more rationally exercised, by preliminary resort to an agency better equipped than courts to resolve an issue in the first instance; or, in a word, whether preliminary reference of issues to the agency will promote that proper working relationship between court and agency that the primary jurisdiction doctrine seeks to facilitate. Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574575 (1952); see also Western Pacific R. Co., supra, at 6365. Cf. 2 R. Pierce, Administrative Law §14.4, p. 944 (2002) (relatively frequent application of the doctrine in pre-emption cases).
Where such conditions are satisfiedand I have little doubt that they are satisfied herecourts may raise the doctrine on their own motion. E.g., Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Empire Gas Corp., 76 F.3d 1491, 1496 (CA10 1996). See also 5 J. Stein, G. Mitchell, & B. Mezines, Administrative Law §47.01[1], pp. 475 to 476 (2002); 2 Federal Procedure: Lawyers Edition §2:337, p. 373 (2003). A court may then stay its proceedingsfor a limited time, if appropriateto allow a party to initiate agency review. Western Pacific R. Co., supra, at 64; see also Wagner & Brown v. ANR Pipeline Co., 837 F.2d 199, 206 (CA5 1988) (stay of limited duration). Lower courts have sometimes accompanied a stay with an injunction designed to preserve the status quo. E.g., Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306, 1316 (CADC 1971). And, in my view, even if Maine should choose not to obtain the Secretarys views on its own, the desirability of the District Courts having those views to consider, supra, at 3, is relevant to the public interest determination that often factors into whether a preliminary injunction should issue, see, e.g., MacDonald v. Chicago Park District, 132 F.3d 355, 357 (CA7 1997); 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §2948, pp. 131133 (1995). But cf. Rosado, 397 U.S., at 406.
For these reasons, I concur in the Courts judgment and in major part in the pluralitys opinion.