Syllabus | Opinion [ Breyer ] | Dissent [ Kennedy ] |
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TOM L. CAREY, WARDEN, PETITIONER v. TONY EUGENE SAFFOLD
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[June 17, 2002]
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
The federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) requires a state prisoner seeking a federal habeas corpus remedy to file his federal petition within one year after his state conviction has become final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The statute adds, however, that the 1-year period does not include the time during which an application for state collateral review is pending in the state courts. §2244(d)(2).
This case raises three questions related to the statutory word pending:
(1) Does that word cover the time between a lower state courts decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court?
(2) If so, does it apply similarly to Californias unique state collateral review systema system that does not involve a notice of appeal, but rather the filing (within a reasonable time) of a further original state habeas petition in a higher court?
(3) If so, was the petition at issue here (filed in the California Supreme Court 41
We answer the first two questions affirmatively, while remanding the case to the Court of Appeals for its further consideration of the third.
I
In 1990 Tony Saffold, the respondent, was convicted and sentenced in California state court for murder, assault with a firearm, and robbery. His conviction became final on direct review in April 1992. Because Saffolds conviction became final before AEDPA took effect, the federal limitations period began running on AEDPAs effective date, April 24, 1996, giving Saffold one year from that date (in the absence of tolling) to file a federal habeas petition.
A week before the federal deadline, Saffold filed a state habeas petition in the state trial court. The state trial court denied the petition. Five days later Saffold filed a further petition in the State Court of Appeal. That court denied his petition. And 41
Approximately one week later, in early June 1998, Saffold filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Federal District Court. The District Court noted that AEDPA required Saffold to have filed his petition by April 24, 1997. It recognized that the statute gave Saffold extra time by tolling its limitations period while Saffolds application for state collateral review was pending in the state courts. But the District Court decided that Saffolds petition was pending only while the state courts were actively considering it, and that period did not include the intervals between the time a lower state court had denied Saffolds petition and the time he had filed a further petition in a higher state court. In Saffolds case those intervals amounted to five days (between the trial court and intermediate court) plus 41
The Ninth Circuit reversed. It included in the pending period, and hence in the tolling period, the intervals between what was, in effect, consideration of a petition by a lower state court and further consideration by a higher state courtat least assuming a petitioners request for that further higher court consideration was timely. Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1266 (2001). It added that Saffolds petition to the California Supreme Court was timely despite the 41
We granted certiorari. We now vacate the judgment and remand the case.
II
In most States, relevant state law sets forth some version of the following collateral review procedures. First, the prisoner files a petition in a state court of first instance, typically a trial court. Second, a petitioner seeking to appeal from the trial courts judgment must file a notice of appeal within, say, 30 or 45 days after entry of the trial courts judgment. See, e.g., Ala. Rule App. Proc. 4 (2001); Colo. App. Rule 4(b)(1) (2001); Ky. Rule Crim. Proc. 12.04(3) (2002). Third, a petitioner seeking further review of an appellate courts judgment must file a further notice of appeal to the state supreme court (or seek that courts discretionary review) within a short period of time, say, 20 or 30 days, after entry of the court of appeals judgment. See, e.g., Ala. Rule App. Proc. 5 (2001); Colo. Rev. Stat. §134108 (2001); Conn. Rule App. Proc. 801 (2002); Ky. Rule Civ. Proc. 76.20(2)(b) (2002). California argues here for a uniform national rule to the effect that an application for state collateral review is not pending in the state courts during the interval between a lower courts entry of judgment and the timely filing of a notice of appeal (or petition for review) in the next court. Brief for Petitioner 36. Its rationale is that, during this period of time, the petition is not under court consideration.
Californias reading of the word pending, however, is not consistent with that words ordinary meaning. The dictionary defines pending (when used as an adjective) as in continuance or not yet decided. Websters Third New International Dictionary 1669 (1993). It similarly defines the term (when used as a preposition) as through the period of continuance of, until the completion of. Id. That definition, applied in the present context, means that an application is pending as long as the ordinary state collateral review process is in continuancei.e., until the completion of that process. In other words, until the application has achieved final resolution through the States post-conviction procedures, by definition it remains pending.
Californias reading would also produce a serious statutory anomaly. A federal habeas petitioner must exhaust state remedies before he can obtain federal habeas relief. The statute makes clear that a federal petitioner has not exhausted those remedies as long as he maintains the right under the law of the State to raise in that State, by any available procedure, the question presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). We have interpreted this latter provision to require the federal habeas petitioner to invok[e] one complete round of the States established appellate review process. OSullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). The exhaustion requirement serves AEDPAs goal of promoting comity, finality, and federalism, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 436 (2000), by giving state courts the first opportunity to review [the] claim, and to correct any constitutional violation in the first instance. Boerckel, supra, at 844845. And AEDPAs limitations periodwith its accompanying tolling provisionensures the achievement of this goal because it promotes the exhaustion of state remedies while respecting the interest in the finality of state court judgments. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 (2001). Californias interpretation violates these principles by encouraging state prisoners to file federal habeas petitions before the State completes a full round of collateral review. This would lead to great uncertainty in the federal courts, requiring them to contend with habeas petitions that are in one sense unlawful (because the claims have not been exhausted) but in another sense required by law (because they would otherwise be barred by the 1-year statute of limitations).
It is therefore not surprising that no circuit court has interpreted the word pending in the manner proposed by California. Every Court of Appeals to consider the argument has rejected it. Melancon v. Kaylo, 259 F.3d 401, 406 (CA5 2001); Payton v. Brigano, 256 F.3d 405, 408 (CA6 2001); Hizbullahankhamon v. Walker, 255 F.3d 65, 72 (CA2 2001); Nyland v. Moore, 216 F.3d 1264, 1267 (CA11 2000); Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 421422 (CA3 2000); Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557, 560561 (CA4 1999); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1005 (CA9 1999); Barnett v. LeMaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (CA10 1999). Like these courts, we answer the first question in the affirmative.
III
Having answered the necessarily predicate question of how the tolling provision ordinarily treats applications for state collateral review in typical appeal States, we turn to the question whether this rule applies in California. Californias collateral review system differs from that of other States in that it does not require, technically speaking, appellate review of a lower court determination. Instead it contemplates that a prisoner will file a new original habeas petition. And it determines the timeliness of each filing according to a reasonableness standard. These differences, it is argued, require treating California differently from appeal States, in particular by not counting a petition as pending during the interval between a lower courts determination and filing of another petition in a higher court. See, e.g., Brief for Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae 518.
Californias original writ system, however, is not as special in practice as its terminology might suggest. As interpreted by the courts, Californias habeas rules lead a prisoner ordinarily to file a petition in a lower court first. In re Ramirez, 89 Cal. App. 4th 1312, 1316, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 232 (2001) (appellate court has discretion to refuse to issue the writ on the ground that application has not [first] been made in a lower court); Harris v. Superior Court of Cal., 500 F.2d 1124, 1126 (CA9 1974) (same); 6 B. Witkin & N. Epstein, California Criminal Law §20, p. 540 (3d ed. 2000) (describing general policy that reviewing court will require application to have been made first in lower court). And a prisoner who files a subsequent and similar petition in another lower court (say, another trial court) will likely find consideration of that petition barred as successive. See, e.g., In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 767771, 855 P.2d 729, 740744 (1993). At the same time, a prisoner who files that same petition in a higher, reviewing court will find that he can obtain the basic appellate review that he seeks, even though it is dubbed an original petition. See In re Resendiz, 25 Cal. 4th 230, 250, 19 P.3d 1171, 1184 (2001) (reviewing court grants substantial deference to lower courts factual findings). Thus, typically a prisoner will seek habeas review in a lower court and later seek appellate review in a higher courtjust as occurred in this case.
The upshot is that Californias collateral review process functions very much like that of other States, but for the fact that its timeliness rule is indeterminate. Other States (with the exception of North Carolina, see Allen v. Mitchell, 276 F.3d 183, 186 (CA4 2001)), specify precise time limits, such as 30 or 45 days, within which an appeal must be taken, while California applies a general reasonableness standard. Still, we do not see how that feature of California law could make a critical difference. As mentioned, AEDPAs tolling rule is designed to protect the principles of comity, finality, and federalism, by promoting the exhaustion of state remedies while respecting the interest in the finality of state court judgments. Duncan, supra, at 178 (internal quotation marks omitted). It modifies the 1-year filing rule (a rule that prevents prisoners from delaying their federal filing) in order to give States the opportunity to complete one full round of review, free of federal interference. Inclusion of Californias reasonableness periods carries out that purpose in the same way, and to the same degree, as does inclusion of the more specific appellate filing periods prevalent in other States. And exclusion of those periods in California would undermine AEDPAs statutory goals just as it would in those States. See Part II, supra.
The fact that Californias timeliness standard is general rather than precise may make it more difficult for federal courts to determine just when a review application (i.e., a filing in a higher court) comes too late. But it is the States interests that the tolling provision seeks to protect, and the State, through its Supreme Court decisions or legislation, can explicate timing requirements more precisely should that prove necessary.
Ordinarily, for purposes of applying a federal statute that interacts with state procedural rules, we look to how a state procedure functions, rather than the particular name that it bears. See Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69, 72 (1946) (looking to function rather than designation that state law gives a state-court judgment for purposes of determining federal jurisdiction); Department of Banking of Neb. v. Pink, 317 U.S. 264, 268 (1942) (per curiam) (same). We find that Californias system functions in ways sufficiently like other state systems of collateral review to bring intervals between a lower court decision and a filing of a new petition in a higher court within the scope of the statutory word pending.
The dissent contends that this application of the federal tolling provision to Californias original writ system will disrupt the sound operation of the federal limitations period in at least 36 States. Post, at 1 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). This is so, the dissent believes, because the prisoner is given two choices when his petition has been denied by the intermediate court: He can file a petition for hearing in the supreme court within 10 days, or he can file a new petition in the supreme court. In re Reed, 33 Cal. 3d 914, 918, and n. 2, 663 P.2d 216, 217, and n. 2 (1983). Why is California different, the dissent asks, from appeal States that also give their supreme courts the power to entertain original habeas petitions? Wont our interpretation of the federal tolling rule, as it applies to California, apply equally to those other States, meaning that even after the statutory time to appeal to the supreme court has expired, the federal limitations period may still be tolled because a prisoner might, at any time, file an original petition?
The answer to this question is no. In appeal systems, the original writ plays a different role. As the Supreme Court of Idaho (one of the States cited by the dissent) explains:
The Supreme Court, having jurisdiction to review on appeal decisions of the district courts in habeas corpus proceedings will not exercise its power to grant an original writ of habeas corpus, except in extraordinary cases. In re Barlow, 48 Idaho 309, 282 P. 380 (1929).
See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Salzinger, 406 Pa. 268, 269, 177 A. 2d 619, 620 (1962) (extraordinary circumstances required for exercise of original jurisdiction); La Belle v. Hancock, 99 N. H. 254, 255, 108 A. 2d 545 (1954) (per curiam) (original authority to grant habeas relief not ordinarily exercised); Ex parte Lambert, 37 Tex. Crim. 435, 436, 36 S. W. 81, 82 (1896) ([E]xcept in extraordinary cases, we will not entertain jurisdiction as a court to grant original writs of habeas corpus).
California, in contrast, has engrained original writsboth at the appellate level and in the supreme courtinto its normal collateral review process. As we have explained, and as the dissent recognizes, the only avenue for a prisoner to challenge the denial of his application in the superior court is to file a new petition in the appellate court. And to challenge an appellate court denial, [f]urther review [of a habeas application] may be sought in [the supreme] court either by a new petition for habeas corpus or, preferably, by a petition for hearing. In re Reed, supra, at 918, n. 2, 663 P.2d, at 216, n. 2 (emphasis added). Unlike States such as, say, Idaho, see In re Barlow, supra, the original writ in California is not extraordinaryit is interchangeable with the petition
for hearing, with neither option bringing adverse consequences to the petitioner. Consequently, we treat California both as similar to other States (in that its original writ system functions like the appeal systems of those other States), and differently from other States (in that the rule we apply to original writs in California does not apply to original writs in other States, precisely because original writs in California function like appeals). And of course, as we have said, California remains free, through legislative or judicial action, to adjust its original writ system accordingly.
IV
It remains to ask whether Saffold delayed unreasonably in seeking California Supreme Court review. If so, his application would no longer have been pending during this period. Saffold filed his petition for review in the California Supreme Court 41
There are many plausible answers to this question. A court will sometimes address the merits of a claim that it believes was presented in an untimely way: for instance, where the merits present no difficult issue; where the court wants to give a reviewing court alternative grounds for decision; or where the court wishes to show a prisoner (who may not have a lawyer) that it was not merely a procedural technicality that precluded him from obtaining relief. Given the variety of reasons why the California Supreme Court may have included the words on the merits, those words cannot by themselves indicate that the petition was timely. And the Ninth Circuits apparent willingness to take such words as an absolute bellwether risks the tolling of the federal limitations period even when it is highly likely that the prisoner failed to seek timely review in the state appellate courts. See, e.g., Welch v. Newland, 267 F.3d 1013 (CA9 2001) (finding limitations period tolled during 4-year gap). The Ninth Circuits rule consequently threatens to undermine the statutory purpose of encouraging prompt filings in federal court in order to protect the federal system from being forced to hear stale claims. See Duncan, 533 U.S., at 179.
If the California Supreme Court had clearly ruled that Saffolds 41
the purpose of seeking clarification in this area of state law.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, we answer the first two issues presented in this case in the affirmative, vacate the judgment below, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.