| KOWALSKI V. TESMER (03-407) 543 U.S. 125 (2004)
333 F.3d 683, reversed and remanded. | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Syllabus | Opinion [ Rehnquist ] | Concurrence [ Thomas ] | Dissent [ Ginsburg ] |
| HTML version PDF version | HTML version PDF version | HTML version PDF version | HTML version PDF version |
JOHN F. KOWALSKI, JUDGE, 26TH JUDICIAL
CIR-
CUIT COURT OF MICHIGAN, et al., PETI-
TIONERS
v. JOHN C. TESMER et al.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[December 13, 2004]
Justice Thomas, concurring.
That this case is even remotely close demonstrates that our third-party standing cases have gone far astray. We have granted third-party standing in a number of cases to litigants whose relationships with the directly affected individuals were at best remote. We have held, for instance, that beer vendors have standing to raise the rights of their prospective young male customers, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192—197 (1976); that criminal defendants have standing to raise the rights of jurors excluded from service, see Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410—416 (1991); that sellers of mail-order contraceptives have standing to assert the rights of potential customers, see Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 682—684 (1977); that distributors of contraceptives to unmarried persons have standing to litigate the rights of the potential recipients, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443—446 (1972); and that white sellers of land have standing to litigate the constitutional rights of potential black purchasers, see Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 254—258 (1953). I agree with the Court that “[t]he attorneys before us do not have a ‘close relationship’ with their alleged ‘clients’; indeed, they have no relationship at all.” Ante, at 5—6. The Court of Appeals understandably could have thought otherwise, given how generously our precedents have awarded third-party standing.
It is doubtful whether a party who
has no personal constitutional right at stake in a case should
ever be allowed to litigate the constitutional rights of
others. Before Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33,
38—39 (1915), and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 535—536 (1925), this Court adhered to the rule
that “[a] court will not listen to an objection made to
the constitutionality of an act by a party whose rights it does
not affect and who has therefore no interest in defeating
it.” Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114, 118
(1900) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because the Court’s opinion is a reasonable application of our precedents, I join it in full.
Notes
*. See also Tyler v. Judges of
Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405,
406—407 (1900); Davis & Farnum Mfg. Co. v. Los
Angeles, 189 U.S.
207, 220 (1903); Owings v. Norwood’s
Lessee, 5 Cranch 344, 348 (1809) (Marshall, C. J.);
In re Wellington, 33 Mass. 87, 96 (1834) (Shaw,
C. J.); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249,
264—266, and n. 6 (1953) (Vinson,
C. J.,
dissenting).