GRAHAM v. FLORIDA ( No. 08-7412 )
982 So. 2d 43, reversed and remanded.
Syllabus

Opinion
[Kennedy]
Concurrence
[Stevens]
Concurrence
[Roberts]
Dissent
[Thomas]
Dissent
[Alito]
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560 U. S. ____ (2010)

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

TERRANCE JAMAR GRAHAM, PETITIONER v.
FLORIDA

on writ of certiorari to the district court of appeal of florida, first district


[May 17, 2010]

Justice Alito , dissenting.

I join Parts I and III of Justice Thomas’ s dissenting opinion. I write separately to make two points.

First , the Court holds only that “for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole .” Ante , at 23–24 (emphasis added). Nothing in the Court’s opinion affects the imposition of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility of parole. Indeed, petitioner conceded at oral argument that a sentence of as much as 40 years without the possibility of parole “probably” would be constitutional. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6–7; see also ante , at 28, n. 12 (T homas , J., dissenting).

Second , the question whether petitioner’s sentence violates the narrow, as-applied proportionality principle that applies to noncapital sentences is not properly before us in this case. Although petitioner asserted an as-applied proportionality challenge to his sentence before the Florida courts, see 982 So. 2d 43, 51–53 (Fla. App. 2008), he did not include an as-applied claim in his petition for certiorari or in his merits briefs before this Court. Instead, petitioner argued for only a categorical rule banning the imposition of life without parole on any juvenile convicted of a nonhomicide offense. Because petitioner abandoned his as-applied claim, I would not reach that issue. See this Court’s Rule 14.1(a); Yee v. Escondido , 503 U. S. 519, 534–538 (1992) .