County of Riverside v. McLaughlin (89-1817), 500 U.S. 44 (1991)
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COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE v. McLAUGHLIN

No. 89-1817

[May 13, 1991]

Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens join, dissenting.

In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), this Court held that an individual detained following a warrantless arrest is entitled to a "prompt" judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to any further restraint on his liberty. See id., at 114-116, 125. I agree with Justice Scalia that a probable-cause hearing is sufficiently "prompt" under Gerstein only when provided immediately upon completion of the "administrative steps incident to arrest," id., at 114. See post, at 4-5. Because the Court of Appeals correctly held that the County of Riverside must provide probablecause hearings as soon as it completes the administrative steps incident to arrest, see 888 F. 2d 1276, 1278 (CA9 1989), I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, I dissent.