Schiro v. Farley (92-7549), 510 U.S. 222 (1994).
Dissent
[ Blackmun ]
Dissent
[ Stevens ]
Opinion
[ O'Connor ]
Syllabus
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 92-7549


THOMAS SCHIRO, PETITIONER v. ROBERT FARLEY, SUPERINTENDENT, INDIANA STATE PRISON, et al.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit

[January 19, 1994]

Justice Blackmun , dissenting.

In Bullington, this Court held that once a capital defendant is acquitted of the death sentence, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars his again being placed in jeopardy of death at a subsequent sentencing proceeding. The majority rejects Schiro's double jeopardy claim on the theory that because "a second sentencing proceeding ordinarily does not violate the double jeopardy clause," it fails to see "how an initial sentencing proceeding could do so." Ante, at 8. The essential holding of Bullington, however, was that capital sentencing proceedings uniquely can constitute a "jeopardy" under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The proceeding examined in Bullingto