| Syllabus | Opinion [ Thomas ] | Dissent [ Stevens ] | Dissent [ Souter ] |
|---|---|---|---|
| HTML version PDF version | HTML version PDF version | HTML version PDF version | HTML version PDF version |
Stevens, J., dissenting
PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND
PAROLE, PETITIONER v. KEITH M. SCOTT
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, MIDDLE DISTRICT
[June 22, 1998]
Justice Stevens, dissenting.
Justice Souter has explained why the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule is implicated as much by a parole revocation proceeding as by a conventional criminal trial. I agree with that explanation. I add this comment merely to endorse Justice Stewart’s conclusion that the “rule is constitutionally required, not as a ‘right’ explicitly incorporated in the fourth amendment’s prohibitions, but as a remedy necessary to ensure that those prohibitions are observed in fact.” Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1389 (1983). See also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 18—19, and n. 1 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 828, and n. 22 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 978, and n. 37 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).