Syllabus | Opinion [ Scalia ] | Concurrence [ Souter ] | Concurrence [ Ginsburg ] | Concurrence [ Opinion of O’Connor ] | Concurrence [ Stevens ] |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
HTML version PDF version | HTML version PDF version | HTML version PDF version | HTML version PDF version | HTML version PDF version | HTML version PDF version |
NEVADA, et al., PETITIONERS v.
FLOYD HICKS et al.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[June 25, 2001]
Justice Ginsburg, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion. As the Court plainly states, and as Justice Souter recognizes, the “holding in this case is limited to the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law.” Ante, at 4, n. 2 (opinion of the Court); ante, at 2 (Souter, J., concurring). The Court’s decision explicitly “leave[s] open the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general,” ante, at 4, n. 2, including state officials engaged on tribal land in a venture or frolic of their own, see ante, at 19 (a state officer’s conduct on tribal land “unrelated to [performance of his law-enforcement duties] is potentially subject to tribal control”).
I write separately only to emphasize that Strate v. A—1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997), similarly deferred larger issues. Strate concerned a highway accident on a right-of-way over tribal land. For nonmember governance purposes, the accident site was equivalent to alienated, non-Indian land. Id., at 456. We held that the nonmember charged with negligent driving in Strate was not amenable to the Tribe’s legislative or adjudicatory authority. But we “express[ed] no view on the governing law or proper forum” for cases arising out of nonmember conduct on tribal land. Id., at 442. The Court’s opinion, as I understand it, does not reach out definitively to answer the jurisdictional questions left open in Strate.